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d'estudis africans**



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Mare de Déu del Pilar, 15, pnal

Telèfon i fax: 93 319 40 08

08003 Barcelona

Correu electrònic: cea@panicea.org

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ARDA

Facultat de Geografia i Història, Torre B, 7è pis

Universitat de Barcelona

c/ Baldri i Reixac s/n

08028 Barcelona

Correu electrònic: arda@trivium.gis.ub.es

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THEMA

Capital social y desarrollo en las comunidades africanas ¿reto o espejismo?

Albert ROCA ALVAREZ

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El capital social es un valor al alza en los estudios de desarrollo. Son muchas las analistas que piensan que podrá contribuir a llenar los «huecos» interpretativos de las aproximaciones economicistas y politológicas habituales. Asimismo, dichos estudiosos creen que podría permitir cuantificar un activo intangible sobre el que podrían trabajar sociedades con escasos niveles de otros recursos, es decir, con poco capital natural, productivo u humano; este es el caso de la mayoría de los países subsaharianos. Sin embargo, su ambigüedad y la forma en que se ha aplicado parecen desautorizar estas expectativas. La confusión etnocéntrica y nada inocente de capital social con sociedad civil hace que la primera noción pierda cualquier capacidad para abordar la diversidad, con lo cual queda vacía de contenido. Pero el debate que el concepto ha levantado constituye una excelente oportunidad para extender la introducción de facciones sociales complejas y multidireccionales en los análisis del reticente desarrollo neopositivista o sus aún innumeradas alternativas.

It Ain't Social, It Ain't Capital and It Ain't Africa

Ben TINE

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Charting the rise of social capital in the 1990s to a position of prominence across the social sciences, the concept is shown to be the product of particular intellectual circumstances at the turn of the millennium. Currently, there is a marked intellectual retreat from the excesses of both postmodernism and neo-liberalism. At the same time, the social sciences are subject to a sustained assault by «economics imperialism» as it seeks to colonise the traditional subject matter of other disciplines. The rise of globalisation as the leading way of understanding contemporary capitalism has been one response, often with a systemic content reflecting emphasis on power, conflict and economic and social structures and processes. Whilst social capital shares some of the chaotic and all-embracing compass of globalisation, it is less radical in content, seeking cooperative positive-sum outcomes having ultimately come to rely heavily on methodological individualism in its origins and momentum. As a result, social capital has both served as an imperialism across social theory and as a facilitator for economic imperialism. These arguments are closely tied to the literature on social capital that has specifically addressed Africa for which it is shown, once again, that analysis developed for/with appropriated for the developed world is being imposed on the developing.

Capital simbòlic, capital social i etimologies africanes: una perspectiva alternativa

Juan Manuel CABEZAS

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L'autor considera que el capital social es un concepto habitual, pràctica, del capital simbòlic: com a tal, garanteix la continuïtat formal de les comunitats i possibilita la realització d'una lta que no és pas estrictament utilitària (produir articles de consum al màxim, maximitzar les inversions econòmiques, incrementar els guanys monetaris...) sinó que cerca la intel·ligència del món i la seva cohesió. El capital social funciona en tant que veu en l'acompliment de la funció simbòlica i, en aquest sentit, els exemples proporcionats pels pobles africans tradicionals resulten paradigmàtics, com també ho són respecte de la praxiologia del capital simbòlic en el terreny i de la seva funció bàsica en les dinàmiques etnocèntriques. El capital social indica la potencial capacitat que una comunitat té per a

generar i mantenir veïns socials eficients. Aquest capital està en connexió amb la que alimenta la informació cultural, codificada com a capital simbòlic. Aquest, a seu torn, es forma i es reconfigura en el mar de sistemes concrets, articulats en base a dos grans eixos fortament àmbrics: l'ètnia i el territori.

Breve caracterização da agricultura da região do Gabão (República da Guiné-Bissau)

Ibraima GUEI GANÓ

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Na República da Guiné-Bissau, há como acontece na maior parte dos países africanos, a actividade económica assenta no sector primário. A região do Gabão, situada na parte leste do país, é um exemplo típico desta situação. Temporalmente referenciado à campanha agrícola de 1993/94, o estudo empírico insinua neste trabalho tem como objectivos principais a caracterização sócio-económica e a análise das potencialidades dos sistemas agro-productivos desta região. Incidentalmente é fornecida uma resenha sobre a evolução recente da economia da República da Guiné-Bissau, onde se pode constatar que o crescimento da economia guineense depende fortemente do sector primário. Seguidamente, apresenta-se a metodologia da recolha de dados que permitiu a caracterização dos sistemas agro-productivos da região do Gabão.

NOTITIA

El poder de curar con elementos vegetales en la etnomedicina ndawé

Virginia FONS

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Este artículo es fruto de una investigación sobre cuestiones de etnomedicina entre los ndawé de Guinea Ecuatorial. Hace especial referencia al tipo de conocimiento y práctica médica especializada de esta población, la llamada etnomedicina practicada por los ngongo (médicos tradicionales). Se ha querido reflexionar sobre cómo los ndawé conciben su mundo como un conjunto de fuerzas invisibles que interactúan entre sí para garantizar el orden del mundo. Los ngongo forman parte de este conjunto que ya llamamos el núcleo duro de la tradición, porque se enfrentan a aquello que provoca el mal, la enfermedad y la muerte, y manipulan el poder de los elementos vegetales en su arte del curar. En este sentido, se tendrá en cuenta el concepto de la equiparación de fuerzas en todo el sistema de pensamiento ndawé. Todo este tipo de cuestiones acostumbra a ser ignoradas por las investigaciones etnobotánicas, que sólo recogen los principios activos de las vegetales, sin tener en cuenta cómo las poblaciones las conciben y el uso que hacen de ellas. Pero el estudio de este conocimiento y práctica médica nos ayuda a entender con un nivel de sentido, tal y es la trascendencia social de la etnomedicina en esta parte del África central.

La naissance du monde selon les bases du livre Cameroun

Alain Roger PRIGA PRIGA

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[Aquest article és un extracte fet per l'autor de la memòria de Maîtrise en Histoire, «La cosmogonie africaine et la cosmogonie basée du Sud-Cameroun: Approche historique d'un acte de continuité millénaire entre l'Égypte pharaonique et l'Afrique noire méridionale» (Université de Yaoundé I, 2000)]. A través d'alguns elements de la cosmogonia dels basaa del Cameroun, l'autor vol oferir pòies sobre el caràcter distint de la cosmogonia dels africans i aportar contribució a desenvolupar les línies d'interpretació de l'oció de Dakar impulsada per Cheikh Anta (Djiv). En altres cosmogònies, els elements són Perseguida de principis fonamentals per a la antropologia i l'actitud dels humans (basaa) amb l'Univers (basaa), sense deixar fer una distinció entre món material i món espirit-

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lual, subjecte i objecte. Aquests principis es manifesten i actuen en la societat basaa tot i l'aparició ineluctable d'un corpus teològic complex i coherent. Tot això obliga l'autor a prendre una opció metodològica doble. Per una banda, contextualització sociohistòrica; ment el discurs mitològic en la societat bassa. En segon lloc, ofereix una descripció del mites que s'apropa molt a l'antropologia en proclamar la necessitat de seguir un procés d'iniciació per tal de poder captar la significació profunda dels símbols i relats abordats, així com la seva actualització ritual i la consegüent projecció social.

Les religions afro-americaines et la production du symbolique dans la Caraïbe. Une introduction au vodu haïtien

Laënnec HURBON

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L'autor descriu les religions afroamericaines, i concretament el vudú haïtià, com un esforç dels esclaus deportats de l'Àfrica per transcendir la seva condició. Aquest esforç consisteix en un treball de l'esperit i opera en el pla simbòlic, que permet la unió dels mons intel·ligible i sensible. Aquesta construcció simbòlica continua implica una lluita contra l'aminènia imposada pels esclavitzadors. Així el vudú estableix un nou espai social definit per la referència simbòlica a l'Àfrica i amb els seus deus, possibilitant la recuperació de la dignitat perduda pels esclaus i la confirmació de les bases d'una comunitat. Aquesta projecció múltiple del vudú, espiritual i social, l'ha convertit en un factor clau de l'evolució política haïtiana. El seu rol, però, no és fàcil ni de comprendre ni de gestionar, donada l'ambivalència de la inserció del vudú en la societat política, una articulació marcada pel que es podria considerar una clandestinitat relativa. Precissament un del desafiaments de la democratització d'Haïti és l'articulació del vudú en un nou marc de pluralisme religiós.

Ethnic and Religious Ties in an African Emigration. Senegalese Immigrants in the United States

Papa DEMBA FALL

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For almost two decades, Senegalese people have been immigrating to the United States, particularly to the State of New York. While they constitute a minority among minority groups generally, they are nonetheless active participants in the cultural dialogue that is such a vigorous feature of the American nation. Upon a study based on the pioneer immigrants, this article demonstrates three major conclusions: a) Senegalese immigration to the U.S. is certainly a product of the economic crisis at home and /or the closing of traditional destinations (France and Francophone African countries); it is more fundamentally inscribed in the process of globalization taking place within the world economy; and of Senegalese adaptation to this trend.

b) The insertion of Senegalese immigrants into the host country is made possible through the essential economic values of American society: opportunity and enterprise. These values are, however, re-interpreted within the context of communal solidarity, the principal pillars of which are ethnic and religious identity. In fact, the ability of Senegalese associations to create these structures ensures the continuation and renewal of the migratory pattern. c) The weak level of participation in social debate, or the introversion of Senegalese migrant groups, is itself the result of cultural negotiations, demanding adaptations and renunciations which are imposed by very strict social control within the group. The material support of the immigrant community protects its members from deviant activities (illicit trafficking, criminality). The fear of moral sanctions and of exclusion from the network of social relations within the group acts as a deterrent to anyone who might soil the image of the group as a whole in the host country. Moreover, it is the role of the original immigrant group to provide appropriate responses and solutions to the concerns of its members: migratory patterns and movements, social communications, etc.

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Últimas discusiones del siglo sobre una ciencia africanista y africana en la francofonía

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La autora aborda la situación de la historiografía africanista francesa de los últimos años de la década pasada. A partir de la lectura y el señalamiento de distintas posiciones críticas frente al estado de la disciplina, Silvina Silva se propone indagar sobre cuáles son las coordenadas que surcan dichas discusiones. En la mayoría de los casos parecen estar más ligadas al ámbito político académico y no sólo referente a la política de los estados africanos sino en relación a las relaciones políticas exteriores que actualmente dominan el campo entre ex metrópolis y países africanos.

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Ethnic and Religious Ties in an African Emigration. Senegalese Immigrants in the United States*

A Noticed Presence

Harlem, N.Y.

Gathered near the restaurant *Keur Samba*, a few Senegalese immigrants were talking loudly about developmental projects for their village, located in the Bassin Arachidier (an intensively peanut growing area). They were happy to have this opportunity to meet. Meanwhile, they all kept their eyes on the traffic on W-116th Street. Indeed, they were waiting impatiently for a friend who was arriving from the airport: their Gambian neighbour had gone in his 'gypsy cab' to pick him up.

Next to the restaurant, there was a hairdressing saloon where a young Senegalese student was having her hair styled. She was with three African-American schoolmates. Her smart jean, as well as her fluency in both English and Wolof, engendered mixed feelings from the other customers and from the employees of the beauty shop.

Brooklyn, N.Y.

A big event was taking place in Flatbush that Sunday afternoon. The *Modou-Modou*¹ dressed in large African 'cafuns', typical baggy trousers, turbans and tasselled fezzes came from all corners to greet their *marabout* (Islamic spiritual leader), who had arrived in town three days before from Rome, via Paris. Travelling by cab in their own cars, the congregation gathered in the apartment called *Keur Serigne Touba* (the home of the *marabout* from Touba, i.e. Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba).²

Portland, OR

The seven Senegalese immigrants who live in Portland → a city where the majority of immigrants are Asians, met in the house of their friend, a white American girl for a party on behalf of a group of Senegalese teachers temporarily visiting the City of Roses. They were listening to some Senegalese music. This was a good opportunity for them to remember the country, and thus to ease the suffering caused by homesickness.

These examples are becoming more and more routine in the country of Uncle Sam. In big US cities such as Atlanta, GA, Cincinnati, OH, Greensboro, NC or Chicago, IL, African 'villages'³, organized around the most dynamic immigrant community, are emerging. The best example is New York City, the main entry port of Senegalese immigrants where the African market located at W-125th Street is well known to travel agencies who often recommend it to tourists.

If, during the 1980's, the Senegalese immigration to the USA was viewed by some people as controversial, now it is a visible reality.⁴

The purpose of this paper is to fill a gap in African immigration studies: the neglect of studies on undocumented immigrants. Indeed, because of the lack of reliable data, this paper does not aim at providing a thorough analysis of Senegalese immigration in USA. Its main objective is to set out the actual picture of that immigration by focusing on the immigrants, as well as on the strategies which facilitate the entry of the Senegalese population.

Hypothesis and Conceptual Framework

Literature on immigration to the United States usually focuses on two major aspects: the racial fitness and its consequence on the labour *quasi*.

In this article, I will examine these issues on African emigration through two main questions:

1. How do Senegalese immigrants manage to settle and perform well through low-cost living in new migratory fields such as the United States?
2. What is their situation at destination, focusing mainly on their access to employment?

The hypotheses developed throughout this paper come from investigations undertaken in September 1997 and November 1999.⁵ These investigations were made easy by the hospitality of the Senegalese living away from their country who were 'buried' for information from it. In America, more than anywhere else, this 'hunger' of information is caused by the fact that undocumented immigrants cannot return home for a visit. By visiting them on their workplace, at home and in entertainment areas, I was able to share their daily lives. I interviewed thirty-five immigrants using a questionnaire, which asked about migration routes, their daily lives and their relationship with other African immigrants and African-Americans.

After putting the 'divorce' of America in its national and international context, Part 1 of this paper will then present the immigrants themselves by answering elemental questions: Who are they? What specific regions in their home country are they from? What kind of chance do they have in a country known for its high level of development and the opportunities it offers?

Part 2 will analyse the ways these immigrants over-

come the problems they have at their arrival and discover economic opportunities, and their impact on the space where they live and work.

Finally, Part 3 demonstrates why the network of solidarity and community organization articulated around ethnic and religious ties makes Senegalese emigration unusual. Examining the Wolof production of difference, I will demonstrate that Senegalese immigrants generate a self-supporting community different from other 'minorities'.⁶

This text shows that the 'naturalization' of the values of group transplanted in the host country and the 'ritualisation' of the social relations between immigrants of a same country carry particular forms of insertion in the country host. I argue that the re-interpretation of ethnic and religious values play a key role in the settlement and the integration of one of the most dynamic 'new comer' groups in America.

The Late 'Discovery' of America

Until the 1970's, Egyptians and Nigerians who were the pioneers, were the majority of African immigrants in the United States. Except for the Cape Verdean,⁷ there were virtually no migrants from sub-Saharan African countries apart from Nigeria. However, since the 1970's, immigrants from sub-Sahara countries have made up 70 per cent of the immigrant population from Africa.

From 1990 to 1996, the number of sub-Saharan Africans living in the whole US has nearly doubled, to about 84,000 from 44,000. By the 2000 census, the official count will exceed 100,000 and the real account probably will be higher. While Nigerians and Ghanaians remain the most numerous among the sub-Saharan African group in New York, many new arrivals are from Francophone West Africa, and many are Muslim.

In the specific case of Senegalese immigrants, it was at the beginning of the 1980's that their presence began to be noticed. That evolution was part of a movement, which profoundly modified both the nature and the agency of African immigration in general, and of Senegalese immigration in particular.

For historical and linguistic reasons, Senegalese immigration had been traditionally oriented towards France. However, for the last two decades, the migration of the Senegalese has been both multidirectional and unstable. At the same time, the geographic source of Senegalese immigration has moved from the area located near the Senegal River, to the center of the country.

By putting together different sets of data⁸, I estimate the number of legal and illegal Senegalese immigrants in the US at approximately 3,000 in 1980, 10,000 in 1990, 20,000 in 1997 and perhaps 30,000 in 1999. The majority of these migrants have decided to stay despite the expiration of their tourist visas and are not included in the statistics available.

According to the available official estimates,⁹ the USA as a migratory field lags far behind the main

destinations for Senegalese immigrants: both in Africa (Gambia 300,000 and Ivory-Coast 100,000) and Europe (France 100,000 and Italy 51,000). The number of Senegalese immigrants in the US represents only 5.71% of the total number of Senegalese people living abroad.

Causes of the Exodus

The common perception of Africa as a desperate continent, bleeding from wounds of war and poverty, would suggest that its inhabitants are equally desperate to escape it. Indeed many are. But others are well educated, and often have relatively good jobs in their homeland, and even middle-class. With the influence of international media, they simply want to see if there is something better beyond their countries borders, and many crave for more resources than Africa can offer.¹⁰

This stereotype has led the media and few specialists to use the word 'crisis' to explain the causes of the late immigration to the USA by West Africans. From their point of view, 'crisis' is reduced to its economic dimension. That narrow approach is made clear by the statements of West Africans, who often focus on the degradation of the ecosystems and the scarcity of resources in both rural and urban areas.¹¹

These themes are evidenced in the following quotations from the immigrants' interviews:

There was no rain in my locality. The long drought and the subsequent impossibility to meet my family's needs forced me to go abroad. (Interview with Bata, Portland, Ore, September 1997).

He who can wear the shoes of his father... Should not ask anything from him. (Interview with Abdou, Harlem, NY, September 1999).

The problems that forced me to migrate to the Capital City are the same that forced me to come here. There was no rain. Gardens were empty and empty each and every year, in Dakar, living expenses were higher and higher, and my resources did not allow me to meet the needs of my family back in the village. (Interview with Modou Niamouré, Atlanta, GA, October 1999).

However, despite the important role played by economic factors, it is necessary to analyze them through the lens of local specificities, as well as through their relationship with the institutional environment.

The new analysis that emerges from this approach shows that Senegalese immigration to Europe is linked to the terrible Sahelian drought that affected the peasant-growing area during the 1970's.¹² It also shows that the migratory process was accelerated by the failure of several policies of national development that led to the ill planned economic adjustment program (1982-1992) devised and sponsored by the World Bank and the IMF.¹³ Indeed, the 1980s marked an inflationary period for urban Senegal and turned out to be a decade of extensive migration especially to Southern Europe.¹⁴ The general poverty and the inability of the business community to encourage family economic units to transform into autonomous private

businesses that could take over the State functions halted the community support system. Families also could no longer meet the needs of their households.¹⁴ Hence, they have been seeing international migration as a new way to reproduce their family units especially since January 1994 when the currency of French-speaking West Africa (CFA) lost 50 per cent of its value.

It matters to indicate however that Gorée island, a land of meeting between the 'vendors of souvenirs' and African-Americans in the early 1980's, played a crucial role in the development of the exodus to the States. In fact, rather than waiting for the tourist season in order to sell their artifacts, some craftsmen choose to export them and stay in the States.

In doing so, Wolof groups living in the center of Senegal, specifically in Diourbel and Louga, followed the Sorinke and the Halpullaar of Northern Senegal who constitute the pioneers of the Senegalese international migration.¹⁵



SENEGAL: Administrative Districts and Ethnic Groups

Although transcontinental migration is often seen as a consequence of rural economic downturn, it is nevertheless linked to causes often not mentioned, that is the political situation in Senegal. As Paul Stoiler¹⁷ has noted, the responsibility of the government is often not taken as a push factor in the immigration debate. In reality, in the case of Senegalese, the fact that immigrants didn't speak of this factor is linked to their homesickness, which reinforces their love for the home country.

It is worth mentioning that the attitude of the pioneer Senegalese emigrants who are studied in this

paper is different from that of other intellectual and urban emigrants who are more critical of the political leadership of their country of origin. In fact, being more fatalistic than the second generation of emigrants, the pioneer generation generally invokes God's will to account for the political situation prevailing in their country of origin. In the economic field, however, their strong determination to reverse the situation is totally different from the above-mentioned attitude.

From the comments by immigrants, an other constant theme is the absence of police control once they enter America. Because police control of immigrants is so pronounced in European countries, many immigrants think that the exodus to America is the result of the closing of traditional destinations.¹⁸ In fact, the closing of Europe (in particular France) has pushed Senegalese people to settle in new migratory fields¹⁹ such as the United States, Spain, Italy, Morocco, and South Africa. Almost unanimously all the immigrants who previously stayed in Europe, said that they regretted discovering American 'eldorado' only so late.

We have wasted our time in countries that do not like immigrants. I cannot understand why the Senegalese considered France the center of the world since America is the most powerful industry in the world. (Interview with Ousmane D., Portland, September 1997)

However, when one tries to understand this phenomenon, without reference to the comments of the immigrants themselves, it is clear that Senegalese immigration to the United States is linked to the globalization process. Indeed, the fact that American companies

are leaving the country to improve their economic position means reduced purchasing power for the American middle class. This in turn has made members of that class the principal beneficiaries of the unincorporated business where the majority of Senegalese immigrants work.

To buy a junk watch for a few dollars has a therapeutic function for the young American who dreams of Carter or Rolex. We can say the same thing for people living downtown who use a gypsy cab instead of a yellow cab. (Interview with Makha, N.Y., September 1997)

Therefore, we agree with Donna L. Perry that 'the rise of New York City's informal economy is (...)

tioned to the United States' recent immigration boom, but not caused by it.²⁰

Sociology of the Senegalese Emigrants

A sociological study of Senegalese immigrants based on interviews and questionnaires provided a good idea of their living conditions as well as their conditions of stay. However, because of the small size of the sample, I was forced to extend it by referring to the Senegalese voting list of the New York City polling station.²¹ This provided information on 560 Senegalese voters before their arrival in the United States.

A largely male and relatively old population

Based on the Senegalese voting list in New York City, most Senegalese immigrants are male (a ratio of 30 males for 5 women in this study), there is a high representation of persons more than 40 years of age: 116 were between 40 and 44 (20.71%), 168 were between 45 and 49 (30%), and 119 were between 50 and 54 (21.25%). Thus, 75 per cent of the Senegalese immigrants were 40 or over. Those under 40 represented less than a quarter of the immigrant population.



Figure 1. Distribution of Senegalese Immigrants in New York City by age. Source: Ministry of the Interior, Dakar, 1998.

Senegalese immigrants tend to be older because the idea to immigrate to the United States often comes after a previous stay in another city – a city in Senegal, Africa, or Europe. The first stage in the migration process is a training phase or accumulation phase, which lasts an average of four years, according to the immigrants interviewed. During that period, an immigrant who arrived earlier shelters the newcomer and takes charge of him for a while. In this way he is able to save enough money for the trans-continental immigration (*la monté /the leap*). Like Senegalese immigrants from Europe who see their arrival in the United States as a second chance to rebuild their lives, those coming from Senegal or other African countries also see their arrival in America as a success.

In our sample, of the ten immigrants who arrived in the US within the past two years, only one stayed initially in a Senegalese city (in particular the capital city of Dakar). The lack of a training stage is due to the importance of family solidarity in international immigration. Once the immigrant has a place to stay in and a job, he helps his brother join him directly from the rural area (6 cases sampled). The fact that the majority of immigrants are

old means that a large percentage of them are married (26/30 males sampled). Often, as very devout Muslims who have a strong sense of responsibility towards their wives at home, these men usually have no intercourse with women of the host country, except sometimes to get immigration papers by entering into *marriages blancs* (fake marriages).

A migration dominated by rural Senegalese affiliated with Mouridism

The electoral file shows that immigrants born in Dakar come first in terms of number. However, they represent only 15% of the Senegalese population living in New York. Consequently, one can state that the Senegalese immigration to the USA comes mainly from the rural areas of Senegal.

The centre of the immigration is the peanut-producing area, which is also the heart of the Mouride movement,²² as well as the heart of Wolofland.




Figure 2. Distribution of Senegalese Immigrants in New York City by region. Source: Ministry of the Interior, Dakar, 1998.

The immigration to USA is articulated around sub-groups, which are territorially defined: *Bool-Bool*, *Saloum-Saloum*, *Njambour-Njambour*. Indeed 15.17%, 13.03% and 7.85% of the immigrant population come respectively from the regions of Diourbel, Kaolack and Louga.

The rural origin and the primacy of Mouridism give a key role in the immigration experience. Since Mouridism comes from a Sufi tradition, the philosophy of Senegalese Islam, its value system and its ways of life control the relationship between disciples themselves, and between them and their spiritual guides, as demonstrated below. As a consequence, in the group under study, religion determines the hierarchy ladder.

Professional handicaps at arrival

Because immigrants are unprepared for life in big American cities, they are often overwhelmed by both the size of the country, and by a new economic reality.

The distribution of the immigrant population by professional activities before their arrival in USA shows a contradiction between the lack of qualification and the general understanding that American immigration is limited to skilled workers.

The majority of Senegalese immigrants do not have any professional qualification that can put them into the working class: 78 have no profession, 434 come from the unincorporated business sector, and 4 are farmers. One must add to this disadvantage the linguistic hurdle, which is a consequence of their low level of education. Among the 35 immigrants interviewed, 17 have never been to (Frélich) school.




Figure 3: Distribution of Senegalese Immigrants by Occupation before their arrival in New York.

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Dakar 1998.

Hence it becomes necessary for them to have a strong network in order to develop some way to make money that does not require previous training. The need to survive becomes the most important 'qualification' for people whose frame of reference is their understanding that they are in America to make money without losing their tradition and cultural values. Trained to overcome privation and frustration in the Koranic rural school (*daara*) during their youth in rural Senegal, these immigrants never give up. They have the virtue of being resistant and well opinionated.

Here, the city never sleeps. People work all the time. Whether it rains or it snows, we are always trying to make money legally. (Interview with Tapia, N.Y. September 1997)

Economic Insertion

We can see the insertion of the Senegalese immigrants into the economy of their host country in three areas: small-unincorporated businesses, service activities to satisfy the needs of the immigrant community, and to a lesser extent, jobs in the formal sector.

Street Peddling

The first activity open to a Senegalese immigrant who arrives in America is street peddling. His 'tutor', the person who has taken responsibility for him, introduces him to the businessmen (usually Asian-Americans) with whom he has developed good relationships. The nature of the welcome the newcomer receives from them is in direct proportion to the kind of relationship between the 'tutor' and the Asian shopkeepers. This recommendation is so important that the popularity of the pioneer immigrants is based on the number of people they helped during their first days in the country.

After receiving advice on how to be successful in America, the new immigrant starts his work as soon as possible. For one week, he'll be with a person in charge of his training in order to help him avoid problems.

Example of all expenditure related to food and housing for one month, the new immigrant can go to

work on his own once he knows to commute by subway, and once he knows how to avoid the brigade Alpha, the special Police in charge of ensuring that street peddlers have licenses.

Selling on the streets, which has created several conflicts with powerful merchants on 5th Avenue, is done in the same manner as in downtown Dakar's main market (Sandaga): illegal peddling, and selling of products which can be carried easily. The genius of Senegalese immigrant street vendors resides in their ability to offer products, which correspond to the demand of the moment. Marianne Boruch²³ notes with humour and admiration that: '... When the sun is shining, they sell sunglasses, and when it rains they sell umbrellas'.

Despite competition with immigrants from other countries, Senegalese immigrants have come to monopolize the 'hot' spaces at Times Square, in the Garment District, in Yorkville, and in Greenwich Village. Once the peddlers have accumulated a certain amount of capital, they send goods overseas for sale through the Senegalese network to countries in Africa and Europe. Thus they rise from the status of street peddlers to high-level economic actors. This is indeed a form of globalization.

Building the Business Community

Working as a street vendor leads to other peddling such as security guard or cab driver. Also, providing services to satisfy the needs of the immigrant community creates lucrative jobs.

The restaurant does not make a profit but it is not losing money either. My aim is to satisfy the Senegalese customers who do not want to eat American food. To make more money, I would have to sell alcohol in order to attract customers from other cultures. (Interview with Omar, N.Y. September 1997)

The growth of business to satisfy community needs has led to the rehabilitation of buildings once used by African-Americans. That's the case of the square located between Madison Avenue and Lenox Avenue. With the help of American Muslims led by Masjid Malcolm Shabazz, Senegalese immigrants have successfully created restaurants and hairdressing salons, as well as businesses oriented toward the sale of beauty products, music tapes and foodstuffs, etc.

There is every likelihood that the support African American Muslims were prone to bring to the Senegalese immigrants in the USA was essentially based on their belief that the Mourid ideology bore some revolutionary dimension which could be of some help in their own struggle as black people in the USA. Their disappointment is all the more devastating as those African Americans have realized that it is practically impossible for non-descendants of the founder of the Mourid brotherhood to reach high-ranking positions on the one hand, and on the other hand the constitution of an independent power within the brotherhood and based away from Touba is also quite impossible.

Of course, immigrants from other West African countries are also in Harlem, as well as across the Harlem River in Bronx... but in the area around

116th Street and Malcolm X Boulevard 'Little Senegal'— Senegalese own more than 80 percent of businesses.²⁴

These businesses have grown largely because they are clustered in apartments or hotels that have been rented by Senegalese immigrants: *Le Cent Dix* or *Le Cinquante*. This clustering is a response to the perceived need for a more secure environment to protect immigrants against the violence from certain people believed to be thugs or hoodlars and whom they call *Yaman*²⁵ (street children), or *Quademian*²⁶ (beggars).

The relative success achieved by Senegalese immigrants has brought about some sort of jealousy and hostility from young African Americans especially in the ghettos. And one of the sorest lessons learned by Senegalese emigrants from their exodus is that the color of the skin is not always a unifying factor. Most of them have been profoundly disappointed by the behavior of those whom they had always considered their "brothers" before sharing with them the same competing arena. In the eyes of many of them American Africans are generally lazy and not ambitious at all.

New «Serfs» of the Service Economy

Once the immigrant gets a paid job, his respect for the schedule and his work ethic help him create a good working relationship with his employer.²⁷ The immigrant will use this relationship to help find work for other Senegalese immigrants, especially in businesses that have problems hiring workers because the jobs available involve heavy labour, and have only low salaries.²⁸ As newspapers point out, Senegalese immigrants are often supermarket and restaurant delivery workers, servers at catered parties, cabdrivers, child-care providers, home health-care workers and apartment cleaners.

The search for better-paid jobs pushes Senegalese immigrants to move to other localities. That mobility is not by chance; it takes place after receiving information from other Senegalese. This African version of the 'westward movement' has been taking place for the past ten years, and has led to the creation of Senegalese 'villages' in Ohio, North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi and California.

A Strong Network of Solidarity

The strength of Senegalese immigration comes essentially from their sense of group solidarity, which is taken as a virtue and accepted by all Senegalese. That system of mutual help articulated around the Senegalese tradition has a very important social function. If neither ethnicity nor caste has proven to be particularly important in Senegal as a basis for social organization²⁹, the same cannot be said of religion. In fact, Muslim orders constitute the main system of social organization even if references to the exact account of the three main Sufi orders (ways to God) especially the Mouride Brotherhood, are not available.

The fact that every immigrant has benefited from the help of the community during one moment of

his life makes him understand and accept the need for solidarity. When setting up their social organizations, Senegalese immigrants in the USA do not take much into account socio-ethnic particularities; they rather lay the emphasis on their quest for insertion. But as soon as the group becomes larger divergences appear.

There are two levels of solidarity within the community: lay associations based on geographical criteria (locality of origin or of residence), and religious organizations.³⁰

Lay associations

There are two ways in which these associations are formed. Firstly, when space is taken into account, these associations emerge from the consciousness of living in the same area in the host country. Secondly, the reference is to the geographical area in the country of origin. And frequently these forms of organization overlap. Thus, for example, one might consider oneself part of an ethnic movement such as the *Hupulunen*³¹ or a caste association such as the Niéno community in New York.

Several types of lay organisations must be distinguished:

- Cultural associations with ludic vocation (fairs, clubs like *Generation Boul Faal* in honour of the young wrestler Mouhamed Ndaw alias Tyson or the folk singers like Kiné Lam Mame Bamba or Fatou Guéwel Diouf); they rather gather the people originally from urban areas;

- Associations turned towards the development of the region of origin like the Association of Lambaye- Lambaye involved in community projects for the backcountry of Bambey;

- Informal and popular associations for saving and credit as a form of solidarity to allow business initiatives.

Among the lay associations, the most dynamic is the Los Angeles Senegalese Association (LASA), which pulls together all sectors of Senegalese society living in California.

In general, lay associations meet once or twice in a year. They are often not dynamic but they duly make a surprising appearance when big problems affect the community. They are led by immigrants (especially intellectuals with high levels of education) who appreciate the sacrifices made by their fellow citizens.

If women are not present in the management of the religious affairs, they are however very active in the operation of the lay organizations, particularly in the structures of mutual aid or family celebrations of which they are generally the initiators.

Religious Organizations

The most dynamic is without any doubt the *dahira mouride*³², which can also be organized, like lay organizations, around geographical criteria. It is worthwhile to indicate that the share of the choro-

matic authority of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba rather than anything else primarily unites Mouride disciples living abroad.

The *dahira* meets at least once in a week. The central feature of these meetings is the reading of the «crowned texts» (Koran or *Khassaid* ('writings' of Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba). The prayers recited on this occasion have the capacity to protect the community against inaccurate temptations and to support the economic success.

The presence of *dahira* members is not always required because of conflicts between work schedules and other responsibilities of modern urban life. But they must always send their dues (the *adya*, or pledge) for two reasons: to help members in need through the Insurance Fund, and to provide financial support either to spiritual leaders visiting temporarily, or to the supreme spiritual leader for contribution to social work at Touba (The Mouride Holy City)³³ as well as the host country. For example, in New York City, money is being spent to build a guesthouse named *Keur Serigne Touba* at W-135 Street X St Nicholas. And every disciple is obliged to give fifty dollars a month to build the Mouride Mosque in Harlem.

However, to understand the impact of international migration on the major change that has occurred in the relationship between the Senegalese government and the Mouride brotherhood we need more information on the financial contribution of Mouride immigrants to the urban growth of the Mouride 'capital'. In fact, the growing independence of religious leaders from political leaders (specifically the government) may be linked to autonomous financing of the Mouride projects thanks to the immigrants. The latter are convinced that they owe everything to *Serigne Touba* (Mouride spiritual leader) and his representatives on Earth, who in turn will bring them success:

To be Mouride means to work for the spiritual guide. It means to be in touch with the spiritual guide in order to solve his needs whether they are known or not. All our aims are for him. We go here thanking him. He is waiting us. It's therefore normal that he comes to visit us. It means him about our problems and how to deal with them since he is also our representative to American officials. (Interview with members of the *Touba* of New York, September 1997)

In addition to the social function of reliance, the adhesion to Islamic networks plays a significant role in the promotion of commercial activity. Because of relations of confidence, the religious network is used as a support with systems of transfer of money or commercial products towards the country of origin. Even if the reasons which push a follower to supply at the store of a religious fellow are not established perfectly, it does not remain less true that a Mouride will prefer to be supplied in a store held by a Mouride and which is identified as such through its name (*Wakour Khadim, Touba Mbaack Trading, Afame Diara Cautun, Camp Fall Export, Parakhane Grocery*, etc.) while a Tidiane will go readily to *Diobakh Maïck Store* (the founder of the Tidiane brotherhood, i. e. Seydina Maïck Sy).

Sometimes, lay and religious organizations work together to solve a pressing problem—a corpse that needs to be repatriated to Senegal for burial, the punctual need for a lawyer to defend the community interest. Hence every immigrant is required to belong to at least one organization. The organizational control is so rigorous that the youngest (specifically those who come from urban areas) find difficult the loss of independence, which may result from their membership in the brotherhood.

No one would argue that Senegalese immigrants have no bad habits³⁴, but most would believe in the migrants' principle of social control. Those who do not follow rules of behaviour are excluded from the network of support. For example, the majority of the Senegalese immigrants cannot trust persons with criminal record that may jeopardize their immigration status. Once excluded from this support, the immigrant finds himself lonely, and has to find a new community, which sometimes leads him to commit criminal acts. This explains why the immigrant who interacts with non-Africans in illegal activities does so in total secrecy.

With my Jamaican friend, we have done everything except to kill somebody. We live in the Puerto Rican sector of Bronx... We have made a lot of money by selling crack... I have asked for forgiveness, but the Senegalese no longer trust me. (Interview with Khalil in *Atlas*, New York, September 1997)

Conclusion

For Senegalese immigrants, despite the gap between the dream and the reality, America is nonetheless a Promised Land. Indeed, the determination of the Senegalese to try their chance in this country is related to a widespread idea: "America is the country of opportunities" and the explosive situation of demographic transition in Senegal. It is maintained by the image of the migrants who invest in their country of origin and return regularly in Senegal for a visit.

The moral strength of the immigrants and their sense of group solidarity constitute their principal tools when facing North American mega-cities, where their lack of skill and urban violence are major constraints. Indeed, the originality of Senegalese migration to the United States can be seen in the pioneer migrants' determination to overcome their handicaps and to transform the space where they live and work in the host country. But their future in America depends largely on how they can solve the problem of travelling back and forth between Senegal and the host country.

Since a regulation or amnesty is not on the agenda, the Senegalese example shows that the integration of their communities who have illegally settled in America are reduced to circumstantial strategies of insertion. In fact, their status constitutes an obstacle to the building of visible links with their country of origin, whose development is the main reason for their emigration. If correct solutions are not found, this form of immigration which is renewed by dodging and skirting strategies, will cause in the years to come, serious problems.

On the other hand general amnesty for Senegalese immigrants in the USA could bring about unexpected big changes; in the same way, considering the recent migration dynamic marked especially by the arrival of urban migrants with a higher level of education, the map drawn with data from pioneer immigrants could experience profound changes in the demographic composition of immigrants, their sex and age distribution and their survival strategies.

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1. The term used to refer to the seasonal migrants from the prairie basin in search of additional income in the big cities such as Dakar. Not long ago, it was used to refer to all international migrants regardless of their origin. See Papa Demba Fall, «Stratégies et implications fonctionnelles de la migration sénégalaise vers l'Italie», *Migrations-Société*, vol. 10, n° 60, (juin-août 1998): 7-33. Some scholars have laid emphasis on the genius of the *Moudou Moudou* based on their cleverness and their capacities of adjustment, survival and success, in particular Malou Niang, *L'Éthiopie s'adapte et le Sénégal s'inspire d'expériences de ses compatriotes culturels des Senegalais d'aujourd'hui Tome 2: Les Moudou Moudou ou l'éthos du développement*, (Dakar: Presses Universitaires de Dakar, 1998).

2. It is a rallying point of the Mouride community and a welcome centre for Mouride non-migrants where formal and informal meetings and reunions of the fraternity are organized. In all host countries, the congregation of faithful disciples who also view themselves as missionaries take it on themselves as a duty to build houses in the glory of the founding spiritual leader Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba also called *Khalimou Bousouf*.

3. See Janet Alon, «A Little Africa Emerges Along 2 Harlem Blocks», *The New York Times*, December 13, 1995, and Joel McCann, «From Dakar to Detroit», *Forbes*, September 26, 1994.

4. The Impression of invasion in the Christmas of 1982 is addressed by Vicama Eno & Rose Lake, «Carnets à New York: les papiers de l'immigration sénégalaise», *Horizons & Migrations* 1160, 1982:32-37, and seems to have gradually given way to more congenial feelings as recent writings. See the specific analysis of Peter Blauner, «Out of Africa: The Senegalese Peddlers of New York», *New York Times*, February 16, 1983, p. 43; Deborah Sontag, «Unlicensed Peddlers, Unlettered Dreams», *New York Times*, June 14, 1993, p. 1; Marianne Boruch, «The Talk of the Town», *The New Yorker*, July 3, 1989, pp. 25-36 and Donna L. Perry, «African Identities and Urban Immigrants: World Immigrants in New York City», *Africa Today* 44(2), 1995: 229-260.

5. This paper is based upon fieldwork conducted in behalf of MEMGRAFRAN and has continued to the present as part of an ongoing project, «International Migration and Preservation of Identity». My own investigation was made possible by the support of the African American Institute and United States Information Agency who supported two academic visits of Senegalese University Professors in September 1997 and November 1999. I also took the opportunity of the invitation of the Baldy Centre for Law and Social Policy at SUNY - Buffalo Law School, in October 1999, to give a talk on «New Trends in Senegalese Emigration» to complete the further information.

6. In this term, we mean all non-American communities living in the U.S.

7. The Cape Verdean migration to the States can be traced back to the official abolition of slavery. In particular, it concerned peasants originated from the islands of

Santiago, Brava and Fogo. In 1975, the Cape Verdean community for the most part settled in New Bedford, MA and Providence, RI was about 250,000 people, reaching 400,000 in 1990. We must note that 80 to 90% of these Cape-Verdean immigrants have become fully-fledged American citizens and are not included in the group of African immigrants even though they claim their Cape-Verdean descent. For historical report on Cape Verdean Community in the USA see Evan T. Sanderlin, *Follow the Whale*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1956); Elmo P. Hohman, *The American Whaler*, (New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1928); Nelson Eunoo Cabral, «Les migrations aux îles du Cap-Vert», *Journal de la Société des Africanistes*, XLV, III, 1975:181-235. For recent issues, see Raymond A. Almeida, «Nos Ku Nos: A Transnational Cape Verdean Community», (18-26), in *Festival of American Ethnicity, 1995* (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1995), and Papa Demba Fall, «Les Étrangers au Sénégal. Regard sur les stratégies d'insertion économique des Capverdiens», (Durban: Actes de la 3e Conférence Africaine de Population, 1999, vol. 2 : 569-582).

8. A notable fact is that the overwhelming majority of Senegalese are, according to U.S. legislation, constituted by non-immigrants, implying that they can avail themselves of a tentative permit of stay and of work at least, but not of residence. See also Fatou Kane Mbaye, *Problématique de la vie des immigrants sénégalais à New York*, (Dakar/FLSH, Mémoire de maîtrise de géographie, 1997-98).

9. The 1993 EMIUS survey reveals that Senegal is no longer primarily a host country for immigrants but a country supplying immigrants to other countries, especially in West Africa (83% of the total of the 285,204 Senegalese expatriates worldwide). In 1997, the Senegalese Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Expatriates put the number of Senegalese emigrants at 525,000. Obviously, migration is only made of immigrants registered by consulates which are not found in all the countries-receiving Senegalese people. For instance, Spain, where lived nearly 3,500 legal Senegalese immigrants in 1992, is not taken into account in these figures.

10. See Yany K. Djamba, «African Migration to the United States: Volume, Trends, and Employment Opportunities», (Durban: UAP, 3rd African Population Proceedings, 1999, vol. 2: 471-483). See also Sylviane Diouf-Kamara, «Les Africains aux U.S.A. Instants et intellectuels», *Horizons & Migrations* 1160, décembre 1992: 20-26; Kofi K. Appaku, *African Emigrants in United States: A Missing Link in African Social and Economic Development*, (New York: Praeger, 1991).

11. The slowdown in demographic growth in Dakar is the consequence of a 'breakdown' in the urban dynamic and the diversion of migratory flows from rural areas to secondary cities like Touba but also overseas. See RENUAO, *Enquête sur les migrations et l'urbanisation au Sénégal* (EMUS-1995), (Dakar: Direction de la Statistique et de la Prévision, 1995); Jérôme LORBAUD, *Problèmes démographiques et sociologiques de l'immigration au Sénégal: les paysans urbains*, (Université de Paris X, Thèse 3e cycle de géographie, 1986).

12. See Ibrahima Sami, *De l'économie informelle au commerce international: les réseaux des marchands sénégalais d'origine au Sénégal*, (Université de Lyon II: Thèse de doctorat en sociologie, 1993). See also Ousaid Salem, «De la banlieue sénégalaise au Nouvel-Orient: le système commercial mondialisé en France», *Cahiers d'études africaines*, n° 81-83, 1983: 267-283.

13. See Jean-François Bayard, «La revanche des sociétés africaines», *Revue Africaine* 11, 1983: 95-127. For more information on the rise of the informal sector in Senegal, see Brahma Choudhury, Mourid-Courissa Diop, and Catherine Bodin, «Economic Liberalization in Senegal: Shifting Policies of Indigenous Business Interests», *African Studies Review* 41(2), (September 1998): 63-89 and Laurence Mattaing & Marianne Sow, *Les opportunités économiques du Sénégal*, (Paris: Karthala, 1999).

14. See Sylvie Rindler-Schjerve, «Infravilles africaines de migrants sénégalais», *Horizons & Migrations* 1160, (décembre 1993): 16-22, and «Guide bibliographique: Emigration sénégalaise

44 immigration au Sénégal. Publications 1990/1995», *Mondes en développement*, 1, 23, n° 81, 1995: 123-129.

Nelly Robin, «Une nouvelle géographie entre concurrences et redéploiement spatial. Les migrations ouest-africaines au sein de la CEE», *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* X, 1994(3): 7-31.

15. See Philippe Arntome et al. *Les familles dakaraises face à la crise* (Dakar: Ifan-Orstom-Cerpod, 1995).

16. See Sadio Traoré, «Les modèles migratoires sénégalais et poular de la vallée du fleuve Sénégal», *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* X, 1994(3): 61-80. See also the well-documented article of François Manchuelle, «Slavery, Emancipation and Labour Migration in West Africa: The Case of the Soninke», *Journal of African History*, XXX, 1989(1), 89-106: 375-408. According to the author, «the Soninke migration can be dated back to 1848 — before the French slave emancipation of 1905-08». See also DERRA, Paule, «Les enfants d'aujourd'hui: Le voyage dans la tradition orale soninke», *Studia Africana* 6, (mars 1995): 69-82. For data on New Trends in Senegalese Emigration, see the handbook edited by REMJAO, op. cit.

17. Paul Stoller, «Globalizing Method: The Problems of Doing Ethnography in Transnational Spaces», *Anthropology and Humanism* 22 (1), 1997: 81-94. To press our point, we can mention that the tricky Casamance issue has no real bearing on Senegalese-international migration. However, sometimes some Senegalese immigrants claim that they come from that region with a view to getting political asylum, as in the case in South Africa where we conducted a field survey in December 1999.

18. This is the consequence of the EEC migratory policy (known as Schengen policy), which can be dated back to the 1970s. In November 1973, the Federal Republic of Germany completely banned the entry of workers outside the EEC. In 1977, France introduced a «return aid» program offering repatriation allowance of 10,000 FF to all unemployed foreign workers who had worked in France for at least five years. The scheme met with little success and was abandoned by the Mitterrand administration in 1981. A modified scheme was established in 1984 following further industrial difficulties notably in the automobile sector which offered a more substantial inducement for return estimated between 70,000 and 100,000 FF. For recent trends in the European migratory field, see Gilles Simon, *Géodynamique des migrations internationales dans le monde* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995).

19. See Nelly Robin, *Atlas des migrations ouest-africaines vers l'Europe, 1985-1995* (Paris: Éditions de l'Orstom, 1997); (FAN/ORSTOM, *Système et dynamiques des migrations internationales ouest-africaines* (Dakar, 1996) (to be soon reissued); Ouyahou Sidimani et al. «L'intégration africaine en Italie: le cas sénégalais», *Études Internationales*, XXXI, 1, (mars 1993): 125-140; Victoria Ebin, «À la recherche de nouveaux «pouvoirs»: Stratégies commerciales migratoires par temps de crise», *Revue Africaine* 45, (mars 1992): 86-99, and Roger Waldinger, *Still the Immigrant City? African Americans and New Immigrants in Ethnically-Diverse New York* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).

20. Doris L. Perry, op. cit.

21. Available during the 1998's Deputy Elections on the Senegalese Ministry of Interior's Website.

22. Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké (the founder of the Mouride order) has a clear advantage over other Senegalese Muslim leaders — he supposedly performed miracles. One occurred when Senegal's French colonial rulers put him on a ship to send him into exile to Gabon: they forbade him to pray, so he walked on the water and laid his prayer rug on the sea, where he could effectively pray. Upon his last return to Senegal, in 1907, he was granted semi-autonomy over Touba, what is now the largely overcrowded Holy City of Touba, which is now an area of pilgrimage for Senegalese immigrants from all over the world, every year. See also Cheikh Gueye, *La organisation de l'espace dans une ville religieuse: Touba (Sénégal)* (Université Lille Pasteur de Strasbourg: thèse de doctorat, 1989).

23. Marianne Burack, «The Tale of the Town», *The New Yorker* July 3, 1989: 25-28.

24. On a recent visit to Harlem, NY City, I passed many

Senegalese-owned shops had gone bankrupt due to the arrival of new African immigrant groups with more refined commercial sales strategies, such as Egyptians and Somalis.

25. From Afro-American greetings: «Yeh, man».

26. From «Get a quarter, man?».

27. Indeed, several companies that were approached for information refused to cooperate with this investigation. From the body of collected material, however, a broad sketch can be drawn of employers' attitudes towards foreign.

28. An interesting point of my research is that immigrants are not aware that as federal district judge in Fresno ruled that undocumented workers in [USA] are protected by federal civil rights». See Judy Scales-Trent, «Equal Rights Advocates: Addressing the Legal Issues of Women of Color», *Berkeley Women's Law Journal*, vol.18, 1998: 34-80. See also, Emilio Reyneri, «The Role of the Underground Economy in Irregular Migration to Italy: Cause or Effect?», *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24(2) (April 1998): 313-331.

29. The system of social stratification and the shared set of cultural norms are no longer a defining characteristic in Senegalese society. For a discussion of the caste system, see Ronnie Wiight, «The Power of Articulation», (p. 18-26), in W. Arens and L. Karp, (eds.), *Creativity of Power: Cosmology and Action in African Societies*, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989).

30. «In Senegal, Islam is a system of social organization, more than an ideology or theology». See Leonardo A. Villalon, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Desires and Citizens in Faith* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Victoria Ebin, «International Networks and Trading Diaspora: The Mouride of Senegal Absorb», (p. 323-336), in: Antoine Philippe & Diop Abdoulaye Bara, (eds.), *La ville à quichets fermés? Mourides, réseaux et insertion urbaine* (Dakar: IFAN-ORSTOM), and «Les commerçants mourides à Marseille et à New York. Regards sur les stratégies d'implantation», (p.181-213) in Emmanuel Goffin & Pascal Labazée, (eds.), *Grands commerçants d'Afrique de l'Ouest. Logiques et pratiques d'un groupe d'hommes d'affaires contemporains* (Paris: Karthala-Orstom, 1993). On the history of Mouridism, consult the apocryphal analyses of Donald Clarendon O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Cheikh Tidiane Sy, *La confrérie sénégalaise des mourides* (Paris: Présence africaine, 1985); Lucy C. Schirman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970) and Ferdinand Dumont, *Le penser religieux de Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba* (Dakar: NEA, 1974). See also Serge Baché Mbacké, «Les Enfants de l'Éternel ou la biographie de Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbaccké», *Trialalé and annotated by Khadim Mbaccké*, *Souffrir de 1964* (série B) 42 (3), 1980: 554-651; 43(1-2), 1981: 47-108; 45(1-2), 1983: 117-196.

31. The Halpulaar belong to the Fulbe group. They have developed relationships with pular speaking communities such as Hausa of Northern Nigeria and Fula from the Republic of Guinea. This transnational network requires further research. Let's mention that in Senegal, as the Halpulaar, the biggest group among Senegalese immigrants, clearly use the Afro-American assumption that their ancestor had come from the Gulf of Guinea to make their insertion easier.

32. Touba are the urban cells or circles created under Serigne Fallou Mbacké when rural exodus became very important. See Moma-Courrisa Diop, *La confrérie mouride: organisation politique et mode d'implantation urbaine* (Université de Lyon II: Thèse de doctorat en sociologie, 1980). «The exact relative demographic strength of the order (ways to God) is withheld both because it is sure to be a source of contention and because this information is too valuable to political aspirants to be easily relinquished by government officials. Tellingly, the only information on religion provided by the government is the proportion of Muslim to Christians, a cleavage with little political significance». See Leonard A. Villalon, op. cit. p. 279.

33. See Eric Ross, «Touba: a Spiritual Metropolis in a Modern

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Worlds», *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 29 (2), 1995: 222-259. See also, Christian Coulon, «Touba, lieu saint de la confrérie mouride (Sénégal)», 1: 226-238 in *Autrement* 91-92 *Leux d'Islam. Cultes et cultures de l'Afrique à Java*, and «The Grand Magal in Touba: A Religious Festival of the Mouride Brotherhood of Senegal», *African Affairs*, (April

1999) and, Cheikh Gueye, «Touba: les marabouts urbanisants», (:179-203). in Monique Bertrand et Alain Dubresson, (eds.), *Petites et moyennes villes d'Afrique noire*, (Paris: Karthala, 1997).

34. See David Hecht, «New York Dispatch: Watch Men», *The New Republic*, April 12, 1999.



Et Maria Miao. In 1999, se l'è rappresentat
di papias al sign. Uv. Waa Chika.